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ARTICLES
REAFFIRMING RIGHTS: HUMAN RIGHTS
PROTECTIONS OF MIGRANTS, ASYLUM SEEKERS,
AND REFUGEES IN IMMIGRATION DETENTION
ELEANOR ACER AND JAKE GOODMAN*
I. INTRODUCTION
As the gap between human rights law and state practice relating to
immigration detention widens, there is an increasingly acute need for States
and the international community to devote greater attention and commitment
to upholding the human rights of migrants. The April 2010 Georgetown
symposium and the discussions surrounding the proposed International
Migrants Bill of Rights (IMBR) provide an opportunity to highlight the need
for States to ensure that migrants receive the protections to which they are
entitled under human rights law. While the IMBR addresses migrants’ rights
in a variety of contexts, this paper will look closely at some of the most
crucial rights that apply to migrants, refugees and asylum seekers1 who are
held in immigration detention.
Migrants, refugees and asylum seekers are entitled to a broad range of
rights protections. These protections are spelled out in the provisions of core
human rights treaties and regional human rights conventions that apply to all
people, as well as in the specific conventions relating to refugees and
* Eleanor Acer is the Director of the Refugee Protection Program at Human Rights First. Jake
Goodman, formerly the International Policy Fellow at Human Rights First, is a Protection Manager
with the International Rescue Committee–Iraq. The views reflected in this article are not necessarily
those of the IRC. © 2010, Eleanor Acer and Jake Goodman.
1. Art. 1(1) of the proposed IMBR defines a “migrant” as “a person outside of a State of which he
or she is a citizen or national.” While there may not be a universally accepted definition of the term
“migrant,” see e.g., Global Migration Group, International Migration and Human Rights 7 (2008), for
the purpose of this paper, the authors will use the IMBR’s proposed definition. While there has been
some debate about whether the term “migrants” includes asylum seekers and refugees, in this paper
we will use the term “migrant” to include asylum seekers and refugees; however as detailed in this
paper, asylum seekers and refugees are entitled to specific protections under international refugee
law.
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migrants.2 While States have the authority to regulate migration, their
immigration enforcement policies and practices—including those relating to
administrative detention3—must comport with the requirements of interna-
tional human rights law.4
Yet, these rights are often violated. This phenomenon is not limited to one
or two States.5 Recent examples abound. Migrant domestic workers from Sri
Lanka, Indonesia and the Philippines suffer from sexual abuse and violations
of labor standards; migrant workers are exploited and mistreated in Thailand
and Saudi Arabia; and migrant children are left unprotected in Greece.6
Migrants and asylum seekers who are intercepted or rescued in the Mediter-
ranean or the Caribbean have been returned to States of departure in
operations that lack adequate protection safeguards.7 In Thailand, thousands
of Hmong refugees were returned to Laos over the protests of the U.N. and
human rights groups.8 Migrants, asylum seekers and refugees have suffered
from discrimination, intolerance, xenophobia and the escalation of bias-
motivated attacks in many places, including Russia, South Africa, Turkey,
and Ukraine.9 Many states treat migration enforcement and asylum as
2. See G.A. Res. 63/184, Preamble, U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/184 (Mar. 17, 2009) (listing many of the
relevant conventions); Global Migration Group, supra note 1, at 16-17.
3. Administrative detention is distinguished from criminal detention in that its objective is not to
punish or deter, but rather to guarantee that another measure, such as deportation or expulsion, can be
carried out. See U.N. High Comm’n for Human Rights, Migrant Discussion Papers: Administrative
Detention of Migrants 1, available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/migration/taskforce/docs/
administrativedetentionrev5.pdf.
4. See, e.g., Juridical Condition and Rights of the Undocumented Migrants Advisory Opinion,
2003 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 18, at 102, 105 (Sept. 17, 2003); G.A. Res. 63/184, supra note 2,
Preamble & ¶ 2 (“[s]tressing the importance of regulations and laws regarding irregular migration
being in accordance with the obligations of States under international law, including international
human rights law” and calling upon “[s]tates to ensure that their laws and policies, including in the
areas of counter-terrorism and combating transitional organized crime such as trafficking in persons
and smuggling of migrants, fully respect the human rights of migrants”); Advisory Opinion on
Juridical Condition and Rights of the Undocumented Migrants, OC-18/03, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., para.
117-118, 134 (Sept. 17, 2003); see also G.A. Res. 64/166, ¶ 3(b), U.N. Doc. A/Res/64/166 (Mar. 19,
2010).
5. See generally Jorge Bustamante, U.N. General Assembly Human Rights Council, Report of the
Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants: Human Rights of Migrants, A/64/213 (2009);
Jorge Bustamante, U.N. General Assembly Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur
on the Human Rights of Migrants: Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political,
Economic, Social, And Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development, A/HRC/7/12 (2008);
David Weissbrodt, U.N. General Assembly Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur
on the Rights of Non-Citizens: Prevention of Discrimination, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/23 (2003).
6. Human Rights Watch, Slow Movement: Protection of Migrants Rights in 2009 (Dec. 2009),
available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/migrants1209.pdf; see, e.g., Hu-
man Rights Watch, From the Tiger to the Crocodile: Abuse of Migrant Workers in Thailand, (Feb. 23,
2010), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/thailand0210webwcover_0.pdf.
7. UN Investigating Case of Asylum-seekers Sent Back to Libya by Italy, July 14, 2009, available
at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4a8a7326c.html; Mark Hetfield, Preventing Migration After-
shock for Haiti, HUFFINGTON POST, Feb. 2, 2010, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mark-
hetfield/preventing-migration-afte_b_446591.html.
8. Seth Mydans, Thailand Begins Repatriation of Hmong to Laos, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 2009, at
A4, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/28/world/asia/28hmong.html; UN Rights Experts
Call for End to Thai Expulsion of Lao Hmong, UN News Centre, Dec. 31, 2009, available at
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID33383&Crhmong&Cr1.
508 GEORGETOWN IMMIGRATION LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 24:507
security issues.10 In the United States, for example, refugees who present no
risk to the country have been mislabeled as “terrorists” or supporters of
“terrorism” under overly-broad immigration law definitions.11
At the same time, States are detaining migrants and asylum seekers in
ways that do not comport with international human rights standards.12 For
example, between 2002 and 2009, the United States rapidly increased its use
of prison-like detention, often detaining asylum seekers without access to
prompt court review of detention.13 Deficiencies in medical care for detained
migrants and asylum seekers have been reported in Egypt, Libya, the United
States and elsewhere.14 In January 2010, the Parliamentary Assembly of the
9. See Human Rights First, 2008 Hate Crime Survey: Violence Based on Racism and Xenophobia (2008),
available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/pdf/fd/08/fd-080924-race-xen-web.pdf; Human Rights First, Vio-
lence Against Muslims: An Update to HRF’s 2008 Hate Crime Survey (2010), available at http://
www.humanrightsfirst.org/discrimination/pdf/3-2010-muslim-factsheet-update.pdf; Office of the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR Concerned over the Murder of an Asylum Seeker in the Ukraine, Press
Briefing (Feb. 1, 2008); Human Rights Watch, South Africa: Punish Attackers in Xenophobic Violence (May
22, 2008); Forced Migration Studies Center, University of Witwatersrand, Migration Issue Brief 3, ‘Xenophia’:
Violence Against Foreign Nationals and Other ‘Outsiders’ in Contemporary South Africa (June 2010),
available at http://www.cormsa.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2009/07/fmsp-migration-issue-brief-3-xenophobia-
june-2010-1.pdf; Helsinki Citizen’s Assembly & Organization for Refugee Asylum and Migration, Unsafe
Haven: The Security Challenges Facing Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Asylum Seekers and
Refugees in Turkey (June 2009), available at http://www.hyd.org.tr/staticfiles/files/unsafe_haven_report.pdf.
10. See Andrew Schoenholtz, Anti-Terrorism Laws and the Legal Framework for International
Migration, in INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION LAW 3, (Ryszard Cholewinski, Richard Perruchoud & Euan
Macdonald eds., 2007); Andrew Schoenholtz & Jennifer Hojaiban, International Migration and
Anti-Terrorism Laws and Policies: Balancing Security and Refugee Protection (Institute for the Study
of International Migration 2008), available at http://isim.georgetown.edu/Publications/
GMF%20Materials/AntiTerrorismLaws.pdf; Eleanor Acer, Refuge in an Insecure Time: Seeking
Asylum in the Post-9/11 United States, 28 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 1361 (2005).
11. See Human Rights First, Denial and Delay, the Impact of the Immigration Law’s “Terrorism
Bars” on Asylum Seekers and Refugees in the United States (Nov. 2009), available at http://
www.humanrightsfirst.info/pdf/RPP-DenialandDelay-FULL-111009-web.pdf. See also Andrew
Schoenholtz & Jennifer Hojaiban, International Migration and Anti-Terrorism Laws and Policies:
Balancing Security and Refugee Protection, Institute for the Study of International Migration,
Transatlantic Perspectives on Migration, Policy Brief #4, (Feb. 2008); David Martin, Refining
Immigration Law’s Role in Counter-terrorism, (Brookings Institution, the Georgetown University
Law Center, & the Hoover Institution 2009), available at http://www.brookings.edu//media/Files/rc/
papers/2009/0310_immigration_martin/0310_immigration_martin.pdf; Schoenholtz & Hojaiban, su-
pra note 10.
12. U.N. Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary
Detention, ¶¶ 54-65, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/13/30 (Jan. 18, 2010); Eur. Parl. Ass., The Detention of
Asylum Seekers and Irregular Migrants in Europe, 1st Part Sess., Res. 1707, ¶ 4 (Jan. 28, 2010). See
also G.A. Res. 63/184, supra note 2. See generally International Detention Coalition, http://
idc.rfbf.com.au/ (last visited Aug. 28, 2010) (listing of reports on migrant detention).
13. Human Rights First, U.S. Detention of Asylum Seekers: Seeking Protection, Finding Prison
14 (2009), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/pdf/090429-RP-hrf-asylum-detention-
report.pdf.
14. See Human Rights Watch, Pushed Back, Pushed Around: Italy’s Forced Return of Boat
Migrants and Asylum Seekers, Libya’s Mistreatment of Migrants and Asylum Seekers 74 (Sept. 2009),
available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/italy0909webwcover_0.pdf (noting that
healthcare in migrant detention centers in Libya is “virtually nonexistent”); Human Rights Watch,
Sinai Perils: Risks to Migrants, Refugees, and Asylum Seekers in Egypt and Israel (Nov. 12, 2008),
available at http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2008/11/12/sinai-perils. See generally Amy Goldstein &
Dana Priest, System of Neglect: As Tighter Immigration Policies Strain Federal Agencies, the
Detainees in Their Care Often Pay a Heavy Cost, WASH. POST, May 11, 2008, at A1; Amy Goldstein
& Dana Priest, In Custody, in Pain: Her Health Problems Worsening as She Fights Deportation, a
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Council of Europe concluded that “[t]he detention of asylum seekers and
irregular migrants in Council of Europe Member States has increased
substantially in recent years” and called on Member States to “comply fully
with their obligations under international human rights and refugee law.”15
Not only have the U.S., Australia, and many European States adopted harsh
policies on the detention of asylum seekers, but—perhaps following these
examples - administrative detention is on the rise all over the world.16 Iraqi
refugees have been detained in Lebanon, with their release conditioned on
their willingness to return to Iraq.17 Migrants and asylum seekers have been
detained without essential human rights protections in Indonesia, Malaysia,
Egypt, Israel, Thailand, Malta, Libya, and many other States.
There is an increasingly wide gulf between the rights of migrants and
asylum seekers under international human rights and refugee law and the
protection of these rights in practice. A March 2009 U.N. General Assembly
resolution entitled Protection of Migrants acknowledged this trend and called
for its reversal, reaffirming that “when exercising their sovereign right to
enact and implement migratory and border security measures, States have the
duty to comply with their obligations under international law, including
international human rights law.” The resolution also called upon States to
“respect the human rights and the inherent dignity of migrants and to put an
end to arbitrary arrest and detention.”18
U.S. Resident Struggles to get the Medical Care She Needs, WASH. POST, May 12, 2008, at A1; Amy
Goldstein & Dana Priest, Suicides Point to Gaps in Treatment: Errors in Psychiatric Diagnoses and
Drugs Plague Strained Immigration System, WASH. POST, May 13, 2008, at A1; Amy Goldstein &
Dana Priest, Some Detainees are Drugged for Deportation: Immigrants Sedated Without Medical
Reason, WASH. POST, May 14, 2008, at A1.
15. Eur. Parl. Ass., supra note 12 at ¶¶ 1, 9.
16. Eur. Parl. Ass., supra note 12, ¶ 1; Jesuit Refugee Services, Alternatives to Detention of
Asylum Seekers 2, Oct. 2008, available at http://detention-in-europe.org/images/stories/
jrs%20europe%20paper_alternatives%20to%20detention.pdf (“The use of administrative detention
of migrants, including asylum seekers, as a tool to manage migration is becoming increasingly
widespread and frequent.”); Shyla Vohra, Detention of Irregular Migrants and Asylum Seekers, in
INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION LAW 49, 63-64 (Ryszard Cholewinski, Richard Perruchoud & Euan
Macdonald eds., 2007). See U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, Opening Remarks, delivered to
Panel Discussion on Human Rights of Migrants in Detention Centers (Sept. 17, 2009), available
at http://www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsf/0/BBD29A58B74B878CC1257635005778E6?
opendocument (“The human rights treaty bodies, the Special Procedures of the Human Rights
Council and the Universal Periodic Review process have underscored with increasing urgency
concerns about human rights violations related to the detention of migrants, and of asylum seekers.”).
See also Press Release, U.N. High Comm’n for Refugees, UNHCR Disappointed at Australian
Decision to Reopen Detention Centre for Asylum-Seekers (Apr. 20, 2010), available at http://
www.unhcr.org/4bcd99956.html.
17. Human Rights Watch, Rot Here or Die There: Bleak Choices for Iraqi Refugees in Lebanon,
30–31 (Nov. 2007), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/lebanon1207.pdf; Nadim
Houry, Impossible Choices for Iraqi Refugees in Lebanon, FOREIGN POLICY, Mar. 24, 2010,
http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/03/24/impossible_choices_for_iraqi_refugees_in_
lebanon.
18. G.A. Res. 63/184, supra note 2, ¶ 17; see also G.A. Res. 64/166, ¶ 3(b), U.N. Doc.
A/Res/64/166 (Mar. 19, 2010); Global Migration Group, Statement of the Global Migration Group on
the Human Rights of Migrants in Irregular Situation (Sept. 30, 2010), available at http://
www.globalmigrationgroup.org/pdf/GMG Joint Statement Adopted 30 Sept 2010.pdf.
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States should review their policies and practices relating to migrants, and
revise them to ensure compliance with their human rights and refugee
protection obligations. The discussions surrounding the proposed IMBR
provide an opportunity to jump-start this process and to encourage States and
the international community to devote more attention to safeguarding the
rights of migrants. Adoption of an IMBR (or set of guiding principles on
migrants’ rights, which has also been discussed) presents an important
opportunity to spell out clearly and strongly the protections that States must
integrate into policies and practices relating to migrants. An IMBR should
not only reaffirm and clarify existing human rights law, but also specify those
protections that are essential to ensuring those rights. Particularly in a time
when States have persistently failed to protect the rights of migrants, it is
vital that the proposed IMBR not represent a retreat from existing protec-
tions. Rather, the proposed IMBR should reinforce the hard won protections
of existing international human rights law and serve as a tool that will
contribute to the more effective protection of migrants’ rights.
This paper outlines some of the key human rights protections that States
must integrate into their use of immigration detention, including: an individu-
alized determination of the need for detention or other restrictions on liberty;
prompt review by an independent court of the decision to detain; periodic
review of the continuing necessity of detention; and detention only in
facilities that are non-punitive and appropriate to the migrants’ status as an
administrative, not criminal, detainee. Migrants and asylum seekers also
enjoy other core protections that are not addressed in this short paper,
including critical protections relating to medical care and legal counsel.19
Too often, States’ detention policies give short shrift to key human rights
protections. As a result, it is particularly important for the proposed IMBR to
devote adequate attention and specificity to addressing these issues. After
analyzing the sources of these protections under existing law, this piece will
suggest ways in which the proposed IMBR could be strengthened to better
protect the rights of detained migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers.
II. THE HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK: THE PROHIBITION OF ARBITRARY
DETENTION AND LIMITS ON DETENTION
The right to liberty and the right to be free from arbitrary detention are
foundational rights under human rights law. The Universal Declaration on
Human Rights (UDHR) declares that “[e]veryone has the right to life, liberty,
19. See Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or
Imprisonment, G.A. Res. 43/173, Principles 11, 17, 18, 24, U.N. Doc A/RES/43/173 (Dec. 9, 1988)
[hereinafter Body of Principles]; U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [hereinafter ECOSOC], Comm’n on
Human Rights, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Civil and Political Rights, Including
Questions of: Torture and Detention, annex 2, principle 2, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2000/4 (Dec. 28, 1999);
U.N. Cong. on the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders, Geneva, Switz., 1955, Standard
Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, ¶¶ 22-26, 92, 94.
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and security of person,” and that “[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary
arrest, detention or exile.”20 The International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR) gives effect to these principles, providing that
“[e]veryone has the right to liberty and security of person” and “[n]o one
shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention.”21 Regional human rights
conventions also contain prohibitions against arbitrary detention, as does
Article 16 of the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of
All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (“Migrant Workers’
Convention”).22 These core human rights protections apply to all persons,
including migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers.23 As such, migrants,
refugees, and asylum seekers have the right to liberty and the right to be free
from arbitrary detention, as contemplated by the UDHR and guaranteed by
ICCPR Article 9 and other human rights conventions.
In that context, the U.N. Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (UNW-
GAD or the Working Group)24 has emphasized that, when migrants are
20. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen.
mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948).
21. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 9, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171,
6 I.L.M. 360, 371 [hereinafter ICCPR].
22. American Convention on Human Rights, art. 7(3), Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123
[hereinafter American Convention on Human Rights]; Convention on Human Rights and Fundamen-
tal Freedoms, art. 5, Sept. 3, 1953, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, [hereinafter European Convention on Human
Rights]; African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, art. 6, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21
I.L.M. 58 (1982); International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers
and Members of Their Families, art. 16(4), Dec. 18, 1990, 2220 U.N.T.S. 93 [hereinafter Migrant
Workers Convention].
23. U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 8: Right to Liberty and Security of
Persons, ¶ 1, June 30, 1982, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6 (2003) (“The Committee points out that
paragraph 1 is applicable to all deprivations of liberty, whether in criminal cases or in other cases
such as, for example, mental illness, vagrancy, drug addiction, educational purposes, immigration
control, etc.”) (emphasis added) [hereinafter General Comment No. 8]; U.N. Human Rights Comm.,
General Comment No. 31: The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on State Parties to
the Covenant, ¶ 10, Mar. 29, 2004, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (2004) (“[T]he enjoyment of
Covenant rights is not limited to citizens of States Parties but must also be available to all individuals,
regardless of nationality or statelessness, such as asylum seekers, refugees, migrant workers and
other persons who may find themselves in the territory or subject to the jurisdiction of the State
Party.”) (emphasis added); U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 15: The Position of
Aliens Under the Covenant, Apr. 11, 1986, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6 (2003) (“In general, the
rights set forth in the Covenant apply to everyone, irrespective of reciprocity, and irrespective of his
or her nationality or statelessness.”); UNHCR Division of Protective Services, Alternatives to
Detention of Asylum Seekers and Refugees, at 6 (Apr. 2006) (prepared by Ophelia Field with the
assistance of Alice Edwards) (“Rights under the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights . . . apply not only to citizens, but equally to asylum seekers and refugees, unless expressly
provided otherwise.”) (internal citations omitted).
24. The Working Group was established by the U.N. Commission on Human Rights as a body of
independent legal experts charged with “investigating cases of detention imposed arbitrarily or
otherwise inconsistently with the relevant international standards set forth in the UDHR or in the
relevant international legal instruments accepted by the States concerned.” C.H.R. Res. 1991/42,
U.N. Doc. E/1991/22-E/CN.4/1991/91 (Jan. 28–Mar. 8, 1991). The Working Group was further
mandated to “seek and receive” information about cases of arbitrary detention, to act on “alleged
cases” of arbitrary detention, and to issue an annual “comprehensive report.” Id. The Human Rights
Council has subsequently assumed the Working Group’s mandate and extended it for a further period
of three years. U.N. Human Rights Council, Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil
Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development: Arbitrary
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detained, there must be “strict legal limitations” and “judicial safeguards,”
and States must justify detention based on criteria that “must be clearly
defined and exhaustively enumerated in legislation.”25 The Working Group
has stressed that administrative detention of migrants should be “the last
resort,” noting that “the principle of proportionality requires it to be the last
resort.”26 The Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants has
emphasized that States should “generally permit detention only as a last
resort” and should implement alternatives to detention.27 The Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe, in its January 2010 resolution, empha-
sized that it is “universally accepted that detention must be used only as a last
resort”28 and that “[d]etention should be used only if less intrusive measures
have been tried and found insufficient.”29 In order to establish that detention
is “necessary” under ICCPR Article 9, States must consider the “less invasive
means of achieving the same ends.”30 In fact, the U.N. General Assembly, in
its March 2009 resolution, called on States to “put an end to arbitrary arrest
and detention” and to adopt where applicable “alternative measures to
detention.”31
Detention, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc A/HRC/6/L.30 (Sept. 28, 2007). For a detailed discussion of the
mechanisms, mandate, and effectiveness of the Working Group, see Jared Genser & Margaret
Winterkorn-Meikle, The Intersection of Politics and International Law: The United Nations Working
Group on Arbitrary Detention in Theory and Practice, 39 COLUM. HUM RTS. L. REV. 687 (2008).
25. U.N. Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary
Detention, ¶ 59, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/13/30 (Jan. 18, 2010).
26. Id.
27. U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of
Migrants, ¶¶ 50, 65, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/7/12 (Feb. 25, 2008).
28. Eur. Parl. Ass., Detention of asylum seekers and irregular migrants in Europe, Res. No. 1707,
¶ 3 (Jan. 28, 2010).
29. Id. ¶ 8; see U.N. Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Report of the Working Group on
Arbitrary Detention, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1999/63/Add.3 (Dec. 18, 1998) (concluding “alternative and
non-custodial measures, such as reporting requirements, should always be considered before
resorting to detention”); Office of the U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, UNHCR Revised Guidelines
on Applicable Criteria and Standards Relating to the Detention of Asylum Seekers, Guideline 3, (Feb.
1999), available at http://www.unhcr.org.au/pdfs/detentionguidelines.pdf (“Where there are monitor-
ing mechanisms which can be employed as viable alternatives to detention . . . these should be
applied first unless there is evidence to suggest that such an alternative will not be effective in the
individual case.”) (emphasis in original) [hereinafter UNHCR Detention Guidelines]; U.N. Sub-
Comm. on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Detention of Asylum-Seekers, Res.
2000/21 (Aug. 18, 2000), available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3dda66394.html (“En-
courages States to adopt alternatives to detention such as those enumerated in the Guidelines on the
Applicable Criteria and Standards relating to the Detention of Asylum-Seekers.”); see also Conven-
tion on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, Annex, 44 U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess. Supp. No. 49,
U.N. Doc. A/44/49, art. 37(b) (Nov. 20, 1989) (“The arrest, detention or imprisonment of a child shall
be in conformity with the law and shall be used only as a measure of last resort and for the shortest
appropriate period of time.”) [hereinafter Convention on the Rights of the Child].
30. C. v. Australia, Human Rights Committee, 76th Sess., Comm. No. 900/1999, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/76/D/900/1999, (Oct. 28, 2002) (noting that, given the detainee’s deteriorating health,
detention became arbitrary where the state did not consider “for example, the imposition of reporting
obligations, sureties or other conditions which would take account of the author’s deteriorating
condition”); see UNHCR Division of Protective Services, Alternatives to Detention of Asylum
Seekers and Refugees, Legal and Protection Policy Research Series, 10, POLAS/2006/03, (Apr.
2006).
31. G.A. Res. 63/184, U.N. GAOR, 63d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/184 (Mar. 17, 2009).
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In addition to the general protections afforded migrants, refugees and
asylum seekers are provided specific protections under international refugee
law. Article 31(1) of the U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
prohibits States from penalizing refugees for their illegal entry or presence.32
Article 31(2) also prohibits States from applying restrictions to the move-
ment of refugees other than those that are “necessary.”33 Both provisions
protect asylum seekers as well as refugees.34 The Executive Committee of
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has con-
cluded that detention should “normally be avoided.” It has identified four
specific grounds on which detention may be resorted to—if “necessary” and
“prescribed by law.”35 The UNHCR, in its guidelines on the detention of
32. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, art. 31(1), 189 U.N.T.S. 150
(entered into force Apr. 22, 1954) [hereinafter Refugee Convention]. Article 31(1) provides: “The
Contracting States shall not impose penalties, on account of their illegal entry or presence, on
refugees who, coming directly from a territory where their life or freedom was threatened in the sense
of article 1, enter or are present in their territory without authorization, provided they present
themselves without delay to the authorities and show good cause for their illegal entry or presence.”
As an Expert Roundtable organized by UNHCR to address Article 31 concluded, “[t]he effective
implementation of Article 31 requires that it apply also to any person who claims to be in need of
international protection; consequently, that person is presumptively entitled to receive the provisional
benefit of the “no penalties” obligation in Article 31 until s/he is found not to be in need of
international protection in a final decision following a fair procedure.” Expert Roundtable organized
by the UNHCR and the Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, Summary Conclusions:
Article 31 of the 1951 Refugee Convention, ¶ 10(g), available at http://www.unhcr.org/
419c783f4.pdf [hereinafter Expert Roundtable]; see also Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, Article 31 of the 1951
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees: Non-penalization, Detention, and Protection, at
195 n.27, 226 n.103 (June 2003) (written at the request of the UNHCR) [hereinafter Goodwin-Gill].
Article 31 applies not only to asylum seekers who have come directly from territories where their life
or freedom was threatened, but also to those who transited through other countries where they were
unable to find effective protection. See Expert Roundtable, supra, ¶ 10(b)-(c); Goodwin-Gill, supra,
at 195 n.28, 226-27 nn.104-05; UNHCR Detention Guidelines, supra note 29, ¶ 4 (Feb. 1999). For a
discussion of the terms “without delay” and “good cause,” see UNHCR Detention Guidelines, supra
note 29, ¶ 4; Expert Roundtable, supra, ¶ 10(e)-(f); Goodwin-Gill, supra, ¶¶ 28, 35. For a detailed
discussion of the beneficiaries of protection under Article 31, see JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE RIGHTS
OF REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 388-405 (2005).
33. Refugee Convention, supra note 32, art. 31(2) (“The Contracting States shall not apply to the
movements of such refugees restrictions other than those which are necessary.”); UNHCR Detention
Guidelines, supra note 29, ¶ 2 (“The Article also provides that Contracting States shall not apply to
the movements of such refugees restrictions other than those which are necessary, and that any
restrictions shall only be applied until such time as their status is regularised, or they obtain
admission into another country.”) (emphasis in original); Expert Roundtable, supra note 32, ¶ 5
(“Article 31(2) calls upon States not to apply to the movements of refugees within the scope of
paragraph 1, restrictions other than those that are necessary, and only until their status is regularized
locally or they secure admission to another country.”). See references in note 32 on this provision’s
application to asylum seekers.
34. Expert Roundtable, supra note 32.
35. The Executive Committee of UNHCR has concluded that “in view of the hardship which it
involves, detention should normally be avoided. If necessary, detention may be resorted to only on
grounds prescribed by law to verify identity; to determine the elements on which the claim to refugee
status or asylum is based; to deal with cases where refugees or asylum-seekers have destroyed their
travel and/or identity documents or have used fraudulent documents in order to mislead the
authorities of the State in which they intend to claim asylum; or to protect national security or public
order.” U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Detention of Refugees and Asylum-Seekers, Conclusion No.
44 (Oct. 13, 1986). The UNHCR’s governing Executive Committee, initially established in 1958, is
currently made up of 79 members, primarily representatives of U.N. member states. The Executive
Committee reviews and approves the agency’s programs and budget, and advises on international
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asylum seekers, has stressed that “the use of detention is, in many instances,
contrary to the norms and principles of international law.”36 The guidelines—
noting the right to seek asylum under Article 14 of the UDHR, the fact that
asylum seekers may not be in a position to comply with the legal formalities
for entry, and the trauma experienced by many asylum seekers—specifically
state that, as a general principle, “asylum-seekers should not be detained.”37
Strengthening the IMBR
The proposed IMBR does not state that detention should “be a last resort,”
nor does it encourage the use of alternatives prior to resorting to detention.
Article 6(1) of the IMBR should be strengthened to make clear that
“detention should be used only as a last resort, and alternatives must be
considered first.” In addition to affirming these protections, the language
could help encourage States to pursue alternatives to detention. Article 6(1)
of the IMBR should also specify that “as a general rule, asylum seekers
should not be detained” so that it is clear that the IMBR is not signaling a
retreat from the protections that attach to asylum seekers who are detained.
III. INDIVIDUALIZED DETERMINATION OF THE NEED FOR DETENTION OR OTHER
RESTRICTIONS ON LIBERTY
Migrants and asylum seekers should only be detained, or subjected to
other restrictions on liberty, based on an individualized assessment in which
the State demonstrates the need for that detention or other restriction on
liberty. As detailed below, the protection against arbitrary detention con-
tained in the ICCPR and other human rights conventions requires an
individualized determination that detention is necessary. Detention (or other
restrictions on liberty) will be arbitrary where it is not reasonable and
necessary in the circumstances of the particular case and is not proportional
to the end sought—an assessment that can only be made through an
individualized determination.
Detention is arbitrary where it is not reasonable and necessary in all the
circumstances of the individual case.38 The Human Rights Committee has
explained:
‘Arbitrariness’ is not to be equated with “against the law”, [sic] but
must be interpreted more broadly to include elements of inappropriate-
ness, injustice and lack of predictability. This means that remand in
protection. See G.A. Res. 1166 (XII), U.N. Doc. A/RES/1166 (Nov. 26, 1957); G.A. Res. 428 (V),
U.N. Doc. A/RES/428 (Dec. 14, 1950).
36. UNHCR Detention Guidelines, supra note 29, ¶ 1.
37. Id., Guideline 2.
38. MANIFRED NOWAK, U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: CCPR COMMENTARY,
173 (N.P. Engel, 1993)
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custody pursuant to lawful arrest must not only be lawful but reason-
able in all the circumstances. Further, remand in custody must be
necessary in all the circumstances, for example, to prevent flight,
interference with evidence or the recurrence of crime.39
Determining whether an individual deprivation of liberty is reasonable and
necessary in all circumstances of the case requires that any restriction on
liberty be proportionate to a State’s legitimate objective.40
Determinations of “reasonableness,” “necessity under the circumstances,”
and proportionality require careful individual consideration of the circum-
stances of each case. The Human Rights Committee has applied this principle
in a number of decisions. For example, in considering a Bangladeshi asylum
seeker’s detention in Australia, the Human Rights Committee concluded that
an asylum seeker’s detention was arbitrary where the state did not justify
detention “in relation to the particular case.”41 In a separate case, the
Committee found an asylum seeker’s detention arbitrary where the State
party had “not demonstrated that, in the light of the author’s particular
circumstances, there were not less invasive means of achieving the same
ends” such as reporting requirements or sureties.42
Not only are individualized assessments necessary to ensure that detention
is not arbitrary within the meaning of Article 9(1) of the ICCPR and other
human rights conventions, but individualized assessments must also be
provided to ensure that any restrictions on the movement of asylum seekers
are necessary within the meaning of Article 31(2) of the Refugee Conven-
39. Van Alphen v. Netherlands, Human Rights Committee, Comm. No. 305/1988, ¶ 5.8, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/39/D/305/1988 (Aug. 15, 1990) (emphasis added). This language is cited in other
Human Rights Committee cases. See, e.g., A v. Australia, U.N. Human Rights Comm., Commc’n No.
560/1993, ¶ 9.2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/59/D/560/1993 (Apr. 30, 1997) (“[T]he Committee recalls that
the notion of “arbitrariness” must not be equated with “against the law” but be interpreted more
broadly to include such elements as inappropriateness and injustice. Furthermore, remand in custody
could be considered arbitrary if it is not necessary in all the circumstances of the case, for example to
prevent flight or interference with evidence.”).
40. NOWAK, U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: CCPR COMMENTARY, 172-73
(Engel, 1993); A v. Australia, supra note 39, ¶ 9.2 (noting “remand in custody could be considered
arbitrary if it is not necessary in all the circumstances of the case, for example to prevent flight or
interference with evidence: the element of proportionality becomes relevant in this context”)
(emphasis added); UNHCR Division of Protective Services, supra note 23, at 9 (“Whether a
deprivation of liberty is considered to be reasonable and necessary will also depend on the
proportionality of the measure with its intended objective.”).
41. Shafiq v. Australia, U. N. Human Rights Comm., Commc’n No. 1324/2004, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/88/D/1324/2004 (Nov. 13, 2006) (finding the state’s contention that asylum seekers
generally abscond was not sufficient “in relation to the author’s particular case”); see also Human
Rights First, Background Briefing Note: The Detention of Asylum Seekers in the United States:
Arbitrary Under the ICCPR (2007), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.info/pdf/061206-asy-
bac-un-arb-det-asy-us.pdf.
42. C v. Australia, supra note 30, ¶ 8.2; see Baban v. Australia, U.N. Human Rights Comm., U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/78/D/1014/2001, ¶ 7.2 (2003) (noting “the State party has not demonstrated that, in the
light of the author’s particular circumstances, there were not less invasive means of achieving the
same ends, that is to say, compliance with the State party’s immigration policies, by, for example, the
imposition of reporting obligations, sureties or other conditions”).
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tion. Consistent with Article 9, Article 31 of the U.N. Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees provides that, “Contracting States shall not apply to
the movements of such refugees restrictions other than those which are
necessary and such restrictions shall only be applied until their status in the
country is regularized or they obtain admission into another country.”43 The
UNHCR Executive Committee has confirmed that detention may only be
resorted to “if necessary” and on “grounds prescribed by law” for certain
specified reasons relating to the individual asylum seeker—including to
verify identity or protect national security, an approach that is also detailed in
UNHCR’s Detention Guidelines.44 The Guidelines stress that detention
based on other grounds—such as the desire to deter future asylum seek-
ers—is “contrary to the norms of refugee law.”45 A November 2001 round-
table of experts assembled by the UNHCR confirmed that, consistent with
Article 31’s necessity requirement, an asylum seeker may be detained only
after a determination that detention was required based on the circumstances
of the individual case.46
That an assessment of the “necessity” of detention or another restriction on
liberty requires an individualized determination should not be surprising. By
its very definition, a finding of “necessity” is not suited to blanket administra-
tive declarations, but rather requires a careful consideration of the circum-
stances of the individual case, the state and individual interests at hand, and
all possible alternatives to detention.47
Strengthening the IMBR
The IMBR should explicitly state that migrants must be provided with an
43. Refugee Convention, supra note 32, art. 31(1) (emphasis added). This protection applies to
asylum seekers, a point confirmed in the conclusions of a group of experts convened by the UNHCR
to examine issues relating to Article 31. See Expert Roundtable, supra note 32.
44. See U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Executive Committee Conclusion on Detention of
Refugees and Asylum Seekers No. 44, (1986) [hereinafter Exec. Comm. 1986 Conclusion] (“If
necessary, detention may be resorted to only on grounds prescribed by law to verify identity; to
determine the elements on which the claim to refugee status or asylum is based; to deal with cases
where refugees or asylum-seekers have destroyed their travel and/or identify documents or have used
fraudulent documents in order to mislead the authorities of the State in which they intend to claim
asylum; or to protect national security or public order.”). The Guidelines also stress that alternatives
to detention should be considered first, requiring an “individual assessment of the personal
circumstances of the asylum-seeker concerned and prevailing local conditions.” Detention Guide-
lines, supra note 32, Guideline 3.
45. Detention Guidelines, supra note 32, Guideline 3.
46. Expert Roundtable, supra note 32, ¶ 10(b) (“The detention of refugees and asylum seekers is
an exceptional measure and should only be applied in the individual case, where it has been
determined by the appropriate authority to be necessary in light of the circumstances of the case and
on the basis of criteria established by law in line with international refugee and human rights law.”).
47. See Goodwin-Gill, supra note 32, ¶ 148; Jorge Bustamante, U.N. General Assembly Human
Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants, ¶¶ 50, 65,
A/HRC/7/12 (2008), http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/14session/A.HRC.14.30.en.
pdf; see U.N. Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary
Detention, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1999/63/Add.3 (1998) (concluding detention should occur only “as a
measure of last resort, after other non-custodial alternatives have proven or been deemed insufficient
in relation to the individual”).
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individualized assessment of the need for their detention or other restriction
on liberty. Because of the fundamental right to liberty, the IMBR should
recognize that it is the State’s burden to show that a migrant’s detention is
necessary. This language could be added to Article 6(1) or 6(2) of the
proposed IMBR. Not only would such a statement reinforce existing stan-
dards, but it would also serve to make clear to States engaging in routine or
“mandatory” detention that deprivations of liberty need to be assessed on an
individualized basis.48
IV. THE RIGHT TO PROMPT, INDEPENDENT AND EFFECTIVE REVIEW OF A
STATE’S DECISION TO DETAIN
If detained, migrants and asylum seekers must be provided prompt court
review of the State’s detention decision. Independent court review is essen-
tial to ensure that detention is not arbitrary and is conducted in accordance
with international law. That review must be effective, not merely pro forma,
and must include a genuine inquiry into the necessity of detention.
This basic right to court review of a decision to detain is well-established
in human rights law. Article 9(4) of the ICCPR explicitly provides such a
right: “Anyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be
entitled to take proceedings before a court, in order that the court may decide
without delay on the lawfulness of his detention and order his release if the
detention is not lawful.”49 Regional and issue-specific human rights conven-
tions provide similar protections. Article 7(6) of the American Convention on
Human Rights, for example, provides that anyone “deprived of his liberty
shall be entitled to recourse to a competent court, in order that the court may
decide without delay on the lawfulness of his arrest or detention and order his
release if the arrest or detention is unlawful.”50 The Inter-American Court
and Inter-American Commission have found the right to challenge detention
under Article 7(6) so central that it may not be suspended even in times of
emergency.51 The European Convention establishes that “[e]veryone who is
48. U.N. Comm. on Human Rights, Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention,
Addendum, Visit to Austl., ¶ 13, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2003/8/Add.2 (2002) (expressing concern that
detention is “without a prior assessment of the particular circumstances of each individual case which
would balance the conflicting interests”), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.
nsf/0/6035497b015966fec1256cc200551f19/$FILE/G0215391.pdf; see Shyla Vohra, supra note 16,
at 55; see also Letter from Amnesty Int’l to the Incoming UK Presidency on the Occasion of World
Refuge Day, The Human Cost of “Fortress Europe”: Detention and Expulsion of Asylum Seekers and
Migrants in the EU (June 20, 2005) (expressing concern that “the authorities are using the risk of
absconding as justification for detention without a detailed and meaningful assessment of the risk
posed by each individual”).
49. ICCPR, supra note 21, art. 9(4).
50. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 22, art. 7(6).
51. Habeas Corpus in Emergency Situations (arts. 27(2) and 7(6) of the American Convention on
Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-8/87 (Jan. 30, 1987) Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) No. 8 (1987);
see Scott Davidson, The Civil and Political Rights Protected in the Inter-American Human Rights
System, in THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF HUMAN RIGHTS, 241 (David John Harris and Stephen
Livingstone eds., 1998).
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deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take
proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided
speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.”52
The Migrant Workers’ Convention provides that migrant workers and their
family members “shall be entitled to take proceedings before a court, in order
that that court may decide without delay on the lawfulness of their detention
and order their release if that detention is not lawful.”53 The Convention on
the Rights of the Child provides each child with the specific “right to
challenge the legality of the deprivation of his or her liberty before a court or
other competent, independent and impartial authority, and to a prompt
decision on any such action.”54
This court review must be “real” and effective, and must include the
possibility of the reviewing court ordering release. The plain text of Article
9(4) requires that the reviewing court shall have the power to “order his
release” should the detention be found unlawful.55 In interpreting Article 9(4)
in A v Australia, the U.N. Human Rights Committee, reviewing the four-year
detention of a Cambodian asylum seeker, concluded that:
In the Committee’s opinion, court review of the lawfulness of detention
under article 9, paragraph 4, which must include the possibility of
ordering release, is not limited to mere compliance of the detention with
domestic law. While domestic legal systems may institute differing
methods for ensuring court review of administrative detention, what is
decisive for the purposes of article 9, paragraph 4, is that such review
is, in its effects, real and not merely formal. By stipulating that the court
must have the power to order release “if the detention is not lawful,”
article 9, paragraph 4, requires that the court be empowered to order
release, if the detention is incompatible with the requirements in article
9, paragraph 1, or in other provisions of the Covenant.56
The Human Rights Committee specifically found that where review was
limited to a finding of the fact that the asylum seeker was indeed a
“designated person” within the meaning of Australia’s Migration Amend-
ment Act, it did not satisfy the requirements of Article 9, Paragraph 4 of the
ICCPR.57 The Committee has affirmed this requirement in its subsequent
jurisprudence.58 In a study on alternatives to detention, UNHCR has also
emphasized that review must be “effective,” and must include the authority
52. European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 22, art. 5(4).
53. Migrant Workers Convention, supra note 22, art. 16(8).
54. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 29, art. 37.
55. ICCPR, supra note 21, art. 9(4).
56. A v. Australia, supra note 39, ¶ 9.5 (emphasis added).
57. Id.
58. Baban v. Australia, supra note 42, ¶ 7.2 (“Judicial review of the lawfulness of detention under
article 9, paragraph 4, is not limited to mere compliance of the detention with domestic law but must
include the possibility to order release if the detention is incompatible with the requirements of the
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to order release.59
In the case of asylum seekers, the Executive Committee of UNHCR has
concluded that “detention measures taken in respect of refugees and asylum
seekers should be subject to judicial or administrative review.”60 A Novem-
ber 2001 panel of experts assembled by UNHCR concluded that, to be
consistent with Article 31, “at a minimum,” detained asylum seekers should
be provided the “right to review the legality and the necessity of detention
before an independent court or tribunal, in accordance with the rule of law
and the principles of due process.”61 UNHCR’s Guidelines call for the
“automatic review before a judicial or administrative body independent of
the detaining authorities” when an asylum seeker is detained, where he or she
can “challenge the necessity of the deprivation of liberty . . . [and] rebut any
findings made.”62
Review should be to an Independent Court
Review of the decision to detain should be to an independent court. Article
9(4) of the ICCPR specifically requires a proceeding before “a court,” a point
emphasized by the U.N. Human Rights Committee in the case of Torres v.
Finland.63 There, the Committee found that an asylum seeker’s detention
violated Article 9 and emphasized that Article 9, Paragraph 4 “envisages that
the legality of detention will be determined by a court so as to ensure a higher
degree of objectivity and independence . . . .” The Committee found that the
Finnish procedures, which provided for appeal through an administrative
process to the Minister of the Interior, were inadequate.64 Though they
provided “some measure of protection,” the Committee stressed that Article
9(4) requires that the legality of detention “be determined by a court so as to
Covenant, in particular those of article 9, paragraph 1.”) (citing A v. Australia, supra note 39 & C. v.
Australia, supra note 30).
59. Field, supra note 47, ¶ 30 (“Moreover, review by the court must be effective. It cannot be
circumscribed by law to particular forms of review. Merely formal review is not sufficient. Most
importantly, the court must be empowered to order release. The absence of effective court review
renders detention arbitrary.”) (citing A v. Australia, supra note 39 & C. v. Australia, supra note 30);
see Goodwin-Gill, supra note 47, ¶ 134.
60. Exec. Comm. 1986 Conclusion, supra note 44, ¶ (e). While not binding law, Executive
Committee Conclusions should be afforded weight under international law, as they are the conclu-
sions of states. See supra note 34.
61. Expert Roundtable, supra note 32, ¶ 11(i). The UNHCR Expert Roundtable also concluded
that “[t]he incorporation and elaboration of the standards of Article 31 in national legislation,
including by providing judicial review in the case of detention, would be an important step for the
promotion of compliance with Article 31 and related human rights provisions.” Expert Roundtable,
supra note 32, ¶ 9.
62. UNHCR Detention Guidelines, supra note 29, Guidelines 5(iv).
63. Torres v. Finland, No. 291/1988, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 44th Sess., Supp. No. 40,
U.N. Doc. A/44/40 (1990) [hereinafter Torres v. Finland]; see also General Comment No. 8, supra
note 23, ¶ 1 (describing “the right to control by a court of the legality of the detention” as an
“important guarantee”).
64. See Torres v. Finland, supra note 63, ¶ 7.2.
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ensure a higher degree of objectivity and independence in such control.”65
The right to review by “a court” is also required under regional agreements
such as the European Convention on Human Rights and the American
Convention on Human Rights.66
The Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons Under Any Form
of Detention or Imprisonment (BOP) also makes clear that all persons
detained have the right to review by an independent court. Specifically, BOP
principle 11.1 states that “[a] person shall not be kept in detention without
being given an effective opportunity to be heard promptly by a judicial or
other authority.”67
That reviewing court or judicial authority must be independent and
impartial. The BOP defines “judicial or other authority” as an “authority
under the law” which affords “the strongest possible guarantees of compe-
tence, impartiality and independence.”68 A judicial procedure outside the
established national court system may meet the requirements of international
law only if it is sufficiently independent, impartial and competent to protect
the individual’s rights.69 The requirement of independence and impartiality is
reflected in the findings and pronouncements of other human rights bodies.
For example, the European Court of Human Rights has ruled that while the
court need not necessarily be “of the classic kind integrated with the judicial
machinery of the country,” it must “exhibit the necessary judicial procedures
and safeguards appropriate to the kind of deprivation of liberty in question,
including most importantly independence of the executive and of the par-
ties.”70
The Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants and the U.N.
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention have repeatedly called on States to
provide court review of detention. For example, after a 2007 mission to the
United States, the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants
concluded that the U.S. detention system lacked safeguards that prevent
detention from being arbitrary within the meaning of the ICCPR and
recommended that “the United States should ensure that the decision to
detain a non-citizen is promptly assessed by an independent court,” and, in
65. Id.
66. European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 22, art. 5(4); American Convention on
Human Rights, supra note 22, arts. 7(5)-7(6).
67. Body of Principles, supra note 19. This provision covers the case of migrants subject to
administrative detention. The BOP defines a “detained person” as “any person deprived of personal
liberty except as a result of conviction for an offence.” See also Body of Principles, supra note 19,
Principle 4, which provides that “[a]ny form of detention or imprisonment and all measures affecting
the human rights of a person under any form of detention or imprisonment shall be ordered by, or be
subject to the effective control of, a judicial or other authority.”
68. Body of Principles, supra note 19, Definitions.
69. Id.
70. Benjamin & Wilson v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H. R., App. No. 28212/95, ¶ 33 (2002)
(citing De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp v. Belgium, 12 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 41-42, ¶¶ 76, 86 (1971); X
v. United Kingdom, 46 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 23, § 53 (1981); Weeks v. United Kingdom, 114 Eur.
Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 30, § 61 (1987).
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addition, that the U.S. Departments of Homeland Security and Justice “revise
regulations to make clear that asylum-seekers can request [their] custody
determinations from immigration judges.”71
Court Review must be Prompt
A court’s review must be prompt. Article 9(4) of the ICCPR requires that
the court “decide” on the lawfulness of detention “without delay.”72 The
American Convention on Human Rights mirrors this language, requiring that
the judicial authority rule “without delay” on the lawfulness of detention.73
The European Convention on Human Rights adopts a similar standard,
giving detainees the right to have the lawfulness of their detention “decided
speedily by a court.”74
Immigration detainees should be brought promptly before a court. In
Torres v. Finland, the Committee found a violation of Article 9(4) where a
Finnish law did not allow for access to court review for the first seven days of
an alien’s detention.75 The Committee explained that “[a]s no challenge
could have been made until the second week of detention, the author’s
detention . . . violated the requirement of Article 9, Paragraph 4 of the
Covenant that a detained person be able ‘to take proceedings before a court,
in order that court [sic] may decide without delay on the lawfulness of his
detention and order his release if the detention is not lawful.’”76 The Body of
Principles for the Protection of All Persons Under Any Form of Detention or
Imprisonment provides that “a person shall not be kept in detention without
being given an effective opportunity to be heard promptly by a judicial or
other authority.”77
The U.N. Working Group on Arbitrary Detention has repeatedly confirmed
this requirement. In Deliberation Number 5, the Working Group explained
that “[a]ny asylum-seeker or immigrant placed in custody must be brought
71. The Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants, Promotion And Protection Of All
Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social And Cultural Rights, Including The Right To
Development, Addendum: Mission to America, ¶¶ 122-23, delivered to the U.N. Human Rights
Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/7/12/Add.2, (Mar. 5, 2008) (prepared by Jorge Bustamante) [hereinafter
Mission to America].
72. ICCPR, supra note 21, art. 9(4).
73. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 22, art. 7(6).
74. Id.; European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 22, art. 5(4).
75. Torres v. Finland, supra note 63.
76. Id.
77. Body of Principles, supra note 19, Principle 11. The Body of Principles defines “judicial or
other authority” as “a judicial or other authority under the law whose status and tenure should afford
the strongest possible guarantees of competence, impartiality and independence.” Id., Use of Terms,
¶ (f). The requirement in Principle 11 is in addition to the requirement in Principle 32 that “[a]
detained person or his counsel shall be entitled at any time to take proceedings according to domestic
law before a judicial or other authority to challenge the lawfulness of his detention in order to obtain
his release without delay, if it is unlawful.” Id., Principle 32.1.
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promptly before a judicial or other authority.”78 In its 1998 Report on the visit
of the Working Group to the United Kingdom on the issue of immigrants and
asylum seekers, the Working Group specifically expressed its concern that, in
the United Kingdom, “[u]pon detention, there is no immediate access to court
or to a quick judicial remedy.”79 In fact, a number of authorities have stressed
that this review should be automatic.80 In its January 2010 report, the
Working Group stressed that “[d]etention must be ordered or approved by a
judge and there should be automatic, regular and judicial, not only adminis-
trative, review of detention in each individual case.”81
Moreover, the U.N. Working Group on Arbitrary Detention recently
reminded States that a judicial authority “shall decide promptly on the
lawfulness” of detention.82 It is not enough that detention be brought under
judicial control promptly; the court must actually decide on the lawfulness of
detention quickly.83 For example, in Tibi v. Ecuador, the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights ruled that a decision issued twenty-one days after the
petition was filed was “clearly an excessive time” and violated the prompt-
ness requirement.84
While habeas corpus is an essential safeguard against arbitrary detention,
in practice this protection often does not function as a prompt court review of
78. Body of Principles supra note 19, Principle 3. In the same document, the Working Group
defined “judicial or other authority” as “a judicial or other authority which is duly empowered by law
and has a status and length of mandate affording sufficient guarantees of competence, impartiality and
independence.” Id.
79. U.N. Comm’n on Human Rights, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Body of Principles
for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment Regarding the
Situation of Immigrants and Asylum Seekers, Principle 3, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2000/4/Annex 2 (Dec.
28, 1999).
80. See ECOSOC, U.N. Comm’n on Human Rights, Report of the Special Rapporteur, Ms.
Gabriela Rodrı´guez Pizarro, Submitted Pursuant to Commission on Human Rights Resolution
2002/62, ¶ 24, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2003/85 (Dec. 30 2002) (prepared by Gabriela Rodriguez Pizarro)
[hereinafter Special Rapporteur on Migrant Workers]; UNHCR Detention Guidelines, supra note 31,
Guideline 5(iii) (as a “minimum procedural guarantee[]”, asylum seekers should be entitled “to have
the decision subjected to an automatic review”). The Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of
Migrants has explained that “[e]ven when the law guarantees the right to judicial review, other
circumstances may undermine it. When the migrant must take the initiative for such review, lack of
awareness of the right to appeal and lack of access to free legal counsel can prevent the migrant from
exercising his/her right in practice.” Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of
Migrants, supra, ¶ 24.
81. U.N. Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary
Detention, ¶ 61, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/13/30 (Jan. 15, 2010).
82. See U.N. Comm’n on Human Rights, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Report of the
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, ¶ 52, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/7/4, (Jan. 10, 2008) (emphasis
added); see U.N. Comm’n on Human Rights, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Report on the
Visit of the Working Group to the United Kingdom on the Issue of Immigrants and Asylum Seekers,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1999/63/Add.3 (Dec. 18, 1998) (expressing concern regarding the lack of “a quick
judicial remedy” and recommending that each decision to detain be reviewed “by means of a prompt,
oral hearing”).
83. See ICCPR, supra note 21, art. 9(4); European Convention, supra note 22, art. 5(4); Am.
Convention on Human Rights, supra note 22, art. 7(6).
84. Tibi v. Ecuador, 2004 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 114, ¶ 134 (Sept. 7, 2004). Though the
court in Tibi was considering a criminal detainee, the court’s interpretation of article 7(6) is also
applicable to other deprivations of liberty.
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detention. In fact, the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention has recently
expressed its concern that the use of habeas corpus is “still weak or
non-existent in some States, particularly with respect to administrative
detention.”85 The Working Group noted that its jurisprudence “is full of
Opinions where States have denied the right of habeas corpus, the detaining
authorities have refused to obey a judicial release order, the proceedings are
unduly delayed, the review is limited to mere technicalities, or States have
suspended habeas corpus during periods of emergency.”86
Decisions to Detain Should be Periodically Reviewed
Any determination that detention is necessary should be subject to periodic
review, a key procedural safeguard against arbitrary detention. This protec-
tion is well grounded in human rights law. The Human Rights Committee, in
applying ICCPR Article 9(1)’s prohibition against arbitrary detention in A v.
Australia, emphasized that “every decision to keep a person in detention
should be open to review periodically so that the grounds justifying the
detention can be assessed.”87 The Body of Principles likewise confirms that a
“judicial or other authority shall be empowered to review as appropriate the
continuance of detention.”88 In the European system, Article 5 of the ECHR
requires periodic review of a detention decision where new issues of
lawfulness are capable of arising.89 In its January 2010 resolution, the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe called on member States to
comply with their obligations under international human rights and refugee
law and specifically encouraged States to ensure that detention is not only
85. U.N. Comm’n on Human Rights, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Report of the
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, ¶ 92, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/13/30 (Jan. 15, 2010). In addition to
addressing the importance of habeas petitions, the Working Group also emphasized that “detention
must be ordered or approved by a judge and there should be automatic, regular and judicial, not only
administrative review of detention in each case.”
86. Id. ¶ 79. The Working Group cites to 19 separate decisions and opinions on the subject,
referencing the inadequacy of habeas as a protection in, among others, the Philippines, the Dominican
Republic, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Zambia, Israel, Vietnam, Colombia, Peru, Eritrea, Pakistan, and the
United States. In one recent U.S. case, involving an asylum seeker who was detained for over 5 years,
over a year had lapsed between the filing of the petition and the issuance of a ruling by the district
court. Nadarajah v. Gonzales, 443 F.3d 1069, 1075 (9th Cir. 2006) (granting a habeas petition for an
asylum seeker who had been detained for over 5 years). Not only does it typically take many months
or longer for U.S. courts to issue decisions in habeas petitions, but U.S. federal courts have in some
cases refused to review detention decisions as long as immigration officials give some reason for
detention, and have also at times declined to exercise jurisdiction. See id. at 1075 (stating that if a
“facially legitimate and bona fide” reason for denying parole is provided, the “denial of parole is
essentially unreviewable”); Veerikathy v INS, 98 Civ. 2591, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19360 (E.D.N.Y.
Oct. 9, 1998). In Rafael Ferrer-Mazorra v. United States, the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights concluded that a habeas review limited to considering whether the detaining authority had
advanced a “facially legitimate and bona fide reason” for the detention decision was not sufficient to
meet the requirement of “effective judicial review” found in Articles I and XXV of the American
Declaration of Human Rights. Rafael Ferrer-Mazorra v. United States, Case 9903, Inter-Am. C.H.R.,
Report No. 51/01, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.111, doc. 20 rev., ¶¶ 234-35 (2001).
87. A v. Australia, supra note 39, ¶ 9.4.
88. Body of Principles, supra note 67, Principle 11 (emphasis added).
89. Benjamin & Wilson v. United Kingdom, supra note 70, at ¶ 33.
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authorized by a judicial authority, but also “subject to a periodic judicial
review.”90 The Inter-American Court of Human Rights, applying Article 7(5)
of the American Convention on Human Rights, has found that the court
“must periodically assess whether the reasons and purposes that justified the
deprivation of liberty remain.”91 This requirement is also reflected in UNH-
CR’s detention guidelines, which state that detained asylum seekers should
be entitled to “regular periodic reviews of the necessity for the continuation
of detention.”92 Periodic review is a safeguard necessary to prevent deten-
tion—which may in some cases have been legitimate at an initial stage—
from becoming arbitrary as the length of the detention grows.93
Strengthening the IMBR
Article 6(2), and to some extent Article 4(4), of the proposed IMBR refer
to the rights due migrants to challenge their detention.94 These provisions
should be strengthened to clarify that migrants are entitled to the protections
discussed in this section. Most critically, though the IMBR refers to the right
“to appeal conditions, legality, and length of detention,” it does not specify to
which body the migrant may appeal. Nor does it confirm that any review or
appeal must be prompt.
In her September 2009 opening remarks at the Human Rights Council, the
U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights stressed that “all too often,
detained migrants are not adequately informed about their rights or do not
have the right or capacity to challenge the legality of their detention before an
independent court.”95 Given that prompt, effective and individualized review
by an independent court is lacking in so many States, the IMBR should
address this issue explicitly and specifically confirm that “when a migrant is
90. Council of Europe: Parliamentary Assembly, Resolution 1707 (2010): The detention of
asylum seekers and irregular migrants in Europe, RES 1707 (2010), available at http://www.unhcr.org/
refworld/docid/4b6bec802.html.
91. Case of Yvon Neptune v. Haiti, 2008 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 180, ¶ 108 (May 6,
2008).
92. UNHCR Detention Guidelines, supra note 29, Guideline 5(iii).
93. See Van Alphen v. Netherlands, U.N. Human Rights Comm., Commc’n No. 305/1988, ¶ 5.8,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/39/D/305/1988 (Aug. 15, 1990); Alfred de Zayas, Human Rights and Indefinite
Detention, 87 INT’L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 15, 17-18 (2005) (“In its jurisprudence the United
Nations Human Rights Committee . . . has made it clear that detention which may be initially legal
may become ‘arbitrary’ if it is unduly prolonged or not subject to periodic review.”).
94. The International Migrants Bill of Rights, art. 6(2) reads: “(2) Detention of migrants shall
occur only in accordance with law and with the right of the migrant to appeal conditions, legality, and
length of detention.” IMBR Network, International Migrants Bill of Rights: Draft in Progress, 24
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 399, 402 (2010). Art. 4(4) reads: “(4) Migrants shall be accorded an effective
remedy for acts violating the rights guaranteed to the migrant by the relevant domestic law as well as
international law, including those rights or freedoms herein recognized.” IMBR Network, Interna-
tional Migrants Bill of Rights: Draft in Progress, 24 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 399, 401 (2010).
95. Navanethem Pillay, U.N. High Commiss’r for Human Rights, Opening Remarks at the
Human Rights Council Panel Discussion on Human Rights of Migrants in Detention Centers
(Sept. 2009), available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/migration/taskforce/docs/
HCStatementPanelMigrants.pdf.
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detained, he or she shall be brought promptly before an independent court
which should rule without delay on the necessity of detention in the
individual case.” Article 6 should also incorporate strong language making
clear that the decision to detain a migrant “must be subject to periodic review
to ensure the continued necessity of detention.”
V. MIGRANTS AND ASYLUM SEEKERS MUST NOT BE DETAINED IN PUNITIVE
OR PENAL CONDITIONS
Human rights law requires that detained persons be treated humanely.
ICCPR Article 10(1) declares that “[a]ll persons deprived of their liberty
shall be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the
human person.”96 Similar provisions are included in other human rights
conventions.97 The Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants has
stressed that Article 10 of the ICCPR requires “that migrants deprived of
their liberty should be subjected to conditions of detention that take into
account their status and needs.”98 As detailed below, when migrants are
subjected to administrative detention, they should be held in conditions that
are non-punitive and non-penal and that take into account their needs and
their status as administrative, not criminal law, detainees.
In the context of migrants and asylum seekers, the U.N. Working Group on
Arbitrary Detention’s Body of Principles provides specifically that, where
detained, immigrants and asylum seekers should be housed in a facility
“specifically intended for this purpose.”99 At a minimum, they “must be
placed in premises separate from those for persons imprisoned under crimi-
nal law” or their detention risks being arbitrary.100 The Migrant Workers’
Convention specifically provides that “any migrant worker or member of his
96. ICCPR, supra note 21, art. 10(1); see Am. Convention on Human Rights, supra note 22, art.
5(2) (“All persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with respect for the inherent dignity of the
human person.”). Human rights law also provides protections against “cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment or punishment.” Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 20, art. 5; The
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, Annex G.A. Res. 46 (XXXIX 1984), 23 I.L.M. 1027 (1984), as
modified, 24 I.L.M. 535 (1985) (entered into force on June 26, 1987) [hereinafter Convention against
Torture]; ICCPR, supra note 21, at art. 7; American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 22, art.
5(2); European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 22, art. 3 (“No one shall be subjected to
torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”).
97. Convention against Torture, supra note 89; American Convention on Human Rights, supra
note 22, art. 5(2); European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 22, art. 3.
98. Report of the Special Rapporteur on Migrant Workers, supra note 80, ¶ 54. The Rapporteur
recommended that “[d]etention of migrants on the ground of their irregular status should under no
circumstance be of a punitive nature.” Id. at 73. See also Global Migration Group, supra note 1, at
32-33. “Status” as used here refers to the distinction between those detained for administrative
purposes and those detained on criminal grounds.
99. U.N. Comm’n on Human Rights, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Body of Principles
for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment Regarding the
Situation of Immigrants and Asylum Seekers, Principle 9, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2000/4/Annex 2 (Dec.
28, 1999).
100. Id.
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or her family who is detained in a State of transit or in a State of employment
for violation of provisions relating to migration shall be held, in so far as
practicable, separately from convicted persons or persons detained pending
trial.”101
In the context of administrative detention, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on
the Human Rights of Migrants has stressed that “[a]dministrative detention
should never be of a punitive nature.”102 In a March 2008 report following a
visit to the United States, the Special Rapporteur expressed concern about the
punitive and “prison-like” nature of detention for immigration detainees in
the United States, concluding that “[t]he conditions and terms of their
detention are often prison-like: freedom of movement is restricted and
detainees wear prison uniforms and are kept in a punitive setting.”103 In fact,
even in the case of non-migrants held on criminal charges pre-trial, the
Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners provide that “[a]n
untried prisoner shall be allowed to wear his own clothing if it is clean and
suitable.”104 Individuals who are detained for administrative purposes under
the immigration law should be provided with at least this level of treatment
and should be allowed to wear their own clothing.105
The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, in its January 2010
resolution on the detention of asylum seekers and irregular migrants, ex-
pressed concern about the increasing use of prisons and other facilities which
are inappropriate for detaining asylum seekers and irregular migrants.106 The
Parliamentary Assembly called on Member States to ensure that detention
complies with human rights and refugee law, including by ensuring that
101. Migrant Workers Convention, supra note 22, art. 17(3).
102. Special Rapporteur on Migrant Workers, supra note 80, ¶ 54.
103. Mission to America, supra note 71, ¶ 28.
104. ECOSOC, Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, adopted by the First
United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders, held at Geneva in
1955, and approved by the Economic and Social Council by its resolution 663 C (XXIV) of July 31,
1957 and 2076 (LXII) of May 13, 1977, ¶ 88(1) [hereinafter Standard Minimum Rules for the
Treatment of Prisoners]. International standards also confirm that unconvicted persons should be
treated in ways, and detained only in conditions, that are appropriate to their unconvicted status.
Principle 8 of the Body of Principles provides that “[p]ersons in detention shall be subject to
treatment appropriate to their unconvicted status.” Body of Principles, supra note 19, Principle 8. The
United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners and the American
Convention on Human Rights also require states distinguish between the convicted and unconvicted,
and detain the unconvicted only in conditions appropriate to their status. See United Nations Standard
Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, supra, ¶¶ 84-85 (referencing “untried prisoners” who
“are presumed to be innocent and shall be treated as such.”); American Convention on Human Rights,
supra note 22, art. 5(4) (“Accused persons shall, save in exceptional circumstances, be segregated
from convicted persons, and shall be subject to separate treatment appropriate to their status as
unconvicted persons.”). The Body of Principles provides that unconvicted persons “shall, whenever
possible, be kept separate from imprisoned persons.” Body of Principles, supra note 19, Principle 8.
The Migrant Workers Convention also incorporates this requirement. Migrant Workers Convention,
supra note 22, art. 17(2) (“Accused migrant workers and members of their families shall, save in
exceptional circumstances, be separated from convicted persons and shall be subject to separate
treatment appropriate to their status as unconvicted persons.”).
105. See Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, supra note 104, ¶¶ 88(1), 94.
106. Eur. Parl. Ass., supra note 12.
2010] REAFFIRMING RIGHTS 527
detainees are accommodated “in centres specifically designed for the purpose
of immigration detention and not in prisons.”107 The Parliamentary Assem-
bly specifically noted the importance of access to family, friends, and
religious or spiritual representatives.108
Refugees and asylum seekers should also not be subjected to punitive or
penal detention conditions. Article 31(1) of the Refugee Convention stipu-
lates that contracting States “shall not impose penalties” on asylum seekers
because of their illegal entry or presence.109 While administrative detention
is permitted in limited circumstances, the term “penalty” certainly includes
imprisonment.110 As Guy Goodwin-Gill has noted, “[a]ny punitive measure,
that is, any unnecessary limitation to the full enjoyment of rights granted to
refugees under international refugee law, applied by States against refugees
who would fall under the protective clause of Article 31(1) could, arguably,
be interpreted as penal.”111
The Executive Committee of the UNHCR has stressed that States should
not house asylum seekers with criminal inmates.112 UNHCR’s Detention
Guidelines emphasize that, consistent with Article 31, “[t]he use of prisons
should be avoided.”113 These guidelines also stress that detention “should not
be used as a punitive or disciplinary measure for illegal entry or presence in
the country.”114 The guidelines call for “the use of separate detention
facilities to accommodate asylum seekers.”115
While the authorities referenced above provide some examples of condi-
tions that are penal in nature—including, for instance, the use of prison
uniforms, excessive restrictions on movement within a facility, and limited
access to family, friends, and religious or spiritual representatives—there are
many other conditions that contribute to making a facility punitive and
inappropriate for administrative detainees. A U.S. governmental report,
which examined some of these conditions in a 2005 study, provides some
107. Id., ¶ 9.2.2.
108. Id., ¶ 9.2.8.
109. Refugee Convention, supra note 32, art. 31.
110. Though “penalties” is not a defined term, it clearly includes imprisonment. See Goodwin-
Gill, supra note 32, ¶ 29. In addition, significant scholarship argues that the term “penalties” applies
to situations outside the purely criminal context. UNHCR Division of Protective Services, Alterna-
tives to Detention of Asylum Seekers and Refugees, Legal and Protection Policy Research Series,
UNHCR, ¶ 15, POLAS/2006/03 (Apr. 2006) (citing Ryszard Cholewinski, Enforced Destitution of
Asylum Seekers in the United Kingdom, 10(3) INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 462 (1998); Goodwin-Gill, supra
note 32, at 185; Alice Edwards, Tampering with Asylum: The Case of Australia, 15(3) INT’L J.
REFUGEE L. 192 (2003)). UNHCR Division of Protective Services has stated, “it is arguable that
detaining asylum seekers or otherwise restricting their freedom of movement without appropriate
justification, could amount to a penalty within the meaning of article 31.” Id.
111. Goodwin-Gill, supra note 47, at 9, n.15.
112. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Executive Committee Conclusion on Detention of
Refugees and Asylum Seekers No. 44, ¶ (f) (1986).
113. UNHCR Detention Guidelines, supra note 29, Guideline 10(iii) (noting that in relation to
article 31(2) “the use of prisons should be avoided”).
114. UNHCR Detention Guidelines, supra note 29, Guideline 3(iv) (emphasis added).
115. Id., Guideline 10(iii).
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insights into the kinds of conditions that make detention punitive. The study,
issued by the bi-partisan U.S. Commission on International Religious Free-
dom, was based, in part, on research and analysis conducted by an expert on
the use of prisons. The Commission concluded that asylum seekers were
being detained in the United States in prison-like facilities that are inappropri-
ate for a non-criminal population.116 The Commission found that U.S.
immigration detention facilities housing asylum seekers are structured and
operated like correctional facilities in virtually all important aspects. At these
facilities, the Commission found:
● Widespread use of segregation, isolation, or solitary confinement for
disciplinary reasons;
● Significant limitations on the privacy, personal freedom, and individu-
ality afforded to detainees;
● A scarcity of private, individual toilets and showers for detainee use
outside the presence of others;
● Use of physical restraints on detainees in 18 of the 19 facilities;
● Sight and/or sound surveillance in virtually all housing units, and
24-hour surveillance lighting in all units;
● Security related searches of all detainees in the general living and
housing areas;
● Multiple “counts” throughout the day to monitor detainee where-
abouts (a single facility refrained from this technique); and
● Lack of staff training focused on the special needs and concerns of
asylum seekers, and even less training designed to enable the staff to
recognize or address the specific problems of victims of torture or
trauma.117
In the years immediately after the Commission issued its report, U.S.
immigration authorities actually increased their use of prisons and prison-
like facilities. In a 2009 report, Human Rights First documented this increase
in prison-like detention, finding that in nearly all facilities, U.S. Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (ICE) “detains asylum seekers in penal and
penitentiary-like conditions: asylum seekers and other immigrant detainees
are stripped of their own clothing and given prison uniforms, not allowed any
contact visits with family or friends, and lack meaningful privacy and access
to outdoor recreation.”118 In addition to concluding that “freedom of move-
ment within the facilities is restricted,” the report also documented the
116. U. S. Comm’n on Int’l Religious Freedom, Report on Asylum Seekers in Expedited Removal,
vol. I: Findings and Recommendations, 4 (2005), available at http://www.uscirf.gov/images/stories/
pdf/asylum_seekers/Volume_I.pdf.
117. Id.
118. Human Rights First, U.S. Detention of Asylum Seekers: Seeking Protection, Finding Prison
17-29 (2009); U. S. Comm’n on Int’l Religious Freedom, supra note 116, at 68-69.
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excessive use of handcuffs and shackles.
Another study, conducted by medical experts, also highlighted the way in
which the use of prison uniforms identifies detained asylum seekers as
criminals. After conducting a comprehensive review of the impact of deten-
tion on asylum seekers, Physicians for Human Rights and the Bellevue/NYU
Center for Survivors of Torture recommended that detained asylum seekers
be permitted to wear their own clothing as a “simple, yet important” way for
asylum seekers to be “able to identify themselves as individuals and not as
criminals.”119
In August 2009, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security announced its
decision to move away from a “jail-oriented approach” to immigration
detention, recognizing that immigration detention should be approached in a
“civil” rather than “penal” manner.120 While indicating an intent to build
facilities more appropriate for immigration detainees, U.S. immigration
authorities also requested that a number of changes be made to eight
facilities—including increased visitation (and contact visitation), increased
outdoor and indoor recreation, greater freedom of movement within facili-
ties, and allowing detainees to wear their own clothing.121
Strengthening the IMBR
The current version of the proposed IMBR states that “States shall take all
appropriate measures to ensure that detention of migrants in connection with
removal proceedings takes place in specialized detention facilities, and in
segregation from ordinary prisoners.” This language is not sufficiently strong
to preserve existing rights and could be interpreted as a weakening of these
protections. The IMBR should be strengthened to specifically confirm that
when migrants are subjected to administrative detention, they should be held
in conditions and facilities that are non-punitive and that are specifically
designed to take into account their needs and their status. It should use
stronger, rights-based language—such as “States shall ensure”—in providing
the protections in this paragraph.
The IMBR could also identify, or at least address in its commentary, some
of the core components that should be reflected in non-punitive detention in
“specialized detention facilities.” Otherwise, these facilities will continue to
be essentially penal facilities, even if immigrant detainees are not detained
with individuals who have been convicted of crimes. For instance, immigrant
119. Physicians for Human Rights & Bellevue/NYU Program for Survivors of Torture, From
Persecution to Prison: The Health Consequences of Detention for Asylum Seekers 191 (June 2003).
120. Press Release, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 2009 Immigration Detention
Reforms (Aug. 6, 2009), http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/factsheets/2009_immigration_detention_
reforms.html.
121. Susan Carroll, ICE to Make Detention Centers More Humane, HOUS. CHRON., June 8, 2010,
available at http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/special/immigration/7043040.html; Michelle Rob-
erts, U.S. Mulls less Jail-like Immigrant Facilities, ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 16, 2010, available at
http://abcnews.go.com/US/wirestory?id10931117&page1.
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detainees should be allowed to wear their own clothing.122 The IMBR could
also specify that such facilities should allow freedom of movement within the
facility and its grounds, provide for contact visits with family, prohibit guards
from wearing correctional uniforms, and ban the use of handcuffs and
segregation as a general rule.123
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper has examined existing human rights law and outlined several
core protections due to migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers in immigra-
tion detention. In doing so, it has identified a number of ways in which the
proposed IMBR should be strengthened in order to reaffirm, and more
accurately reflect, these rights. Article 6 should be strengthened as detailed in
this paper, by incorporating language to reaffirm that (1) detention should be
a last resort, employed only after first considering all alternatives to deten-
tion; (2) a detained migrant should be brought promptly before an indepen-
dent court, which should rule without delay on the necessity of detention
given the circumstances of the individual case; and (3) migrants should not
be detained in penal or prison-like conditions, but should be held separately
from criminal inmates in facilities and conditions appropriate to their status
as administrative, not criminal, detainees. Without greater clarity and speci-
ficity, the IMBR could appear to signal a retreat from these critical protec-
tions.
While the discussions surrounding the proposed IMBR may help to focus
greater attention on the human rights of migrants, much greater attention—
and commitment—is needed to ensure that the human rights of migrants are
actually protected by States. The laws, policies, and practices of many States
fail to provide essential protections to migrants, and existing protections
continue to be eroded as States escalate migration enforcement and deten-
tion. As migration continues to grow and evolve, so too will the hurdles that
face migrants as they attempt to access the rights to which they are entitled.
Not only should the international community devote more attention to
addressing these issues, but States must take concrete steps to change laws,
rules, policies, and practices relating to migrants that do not comport with the
requirements of international human rights law.
122. U. N. Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, supra note 104, ¶ 88(1);
Mission to America, supra note 71 (citing concern that immigrant detainees are required to wear
prison uniforms); see also Physicians for Human Rights and Bellvue/NYU Program for Survivors of
Torture, supra note 119, at 191 (“It is important that detained asylum seekers be able to identify
themselves as individuals and not as criminals. Clothing is a simple, yet important, way to do so.
Given the non-punitive nature of asylum seeker detention, security concerns should not prevent
detainees from wearing street clothing or culturally-relevant clothing such as a turban, shawl or other
such dress.”).
123. Mission to America, supra note 71 (noting lack of freedom of movement and punitive
setting in many U.S. facilities); Human Rights First, U.S. Detention of Asylum Seekers: Seeking
Protection, Finding Prison 71 (2009).
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